APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL FOR A DEFAULTING
CORPORATION IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING
RULE FORTY-THREE of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure1
provides that a defendant shall be present at every stage of his trial.
A corporation, under this rule, "may appear by counsel for all purposes."
Acting within the context of this rule, a federal district court has recently decided that it "must ...have power to appoint" an attorney to
represent a summoned corporation that has defaulted in appearance.
United States v. Crosby2 involved the criminal prosecution of several
individuals and a bankrupt corporation on a general conspiracy charge
involving questions of fraudulent mail and telephone communications
and the sale of unregistered stock in violation of Securities and Exchange Commission regulations& When the corporation defaulted in
appearance after summons, the United States moved that "someone be
appointed" to represent the corporation.
In concluding that it had the power to appoint an attorney in this
situation, the district court reasoned that, because the corporation had to
be present and could only be present if it were represented by an attorney, "judgment of conviction . . .after a trial where it had not
appeared by counsel would therefore be invalid." 4 That the court had
capacity to render a valid judgment was "not open to question," because,
if it could not render judgment, the provision for summoning a corporation would be purposeless.
There is no reported precedent for the problem presented in the
Crosby case.' Moreover, the question of appointing counsel for a de1 "The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition
of sentence, except as otherwise provided by these rules.... A corporation may appear
by counsel for all purposes. In prosecutions for offenses punishable by fine or by imprisonment for not more than one year or both, the court, with the written consent of

the defendant, may permit arraignment, plea, trial and imposition of sentence in the
defendant's absence .... " FED.R. ClI,. P. 4-3.
z24 F.R.D. S (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
' These issues, which do not appear in the report of the decision, were supplied by
a letter to the Duke Law Journal, February 18, 196o, from Thomas F. Burchill, Jr., the
attorney appointed by the court in this case.

'

24 F.R.D. at 15-t6.

Dimock, in his opinion in the instant case, observed that "This is one of
those oft occurring cases where a fundamental question arises which must have been
'Judge
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faulting corporation in a criminal proceeding is not analogous to the
cases dealing with the appointment of counsel for indigent individual
criminal defendants. In such cases it is settled that no individual is
required to have the assistance of counsel if he chooses to present his
own defense." The question that goes to the root of the present case,
however, is whether a corporation may ever appear except by legally
qualified counsel.
The unanimous view, both under the common law and the modern
cases, is that a corporation is incapable of appearing personally in any
action 7 because it can act only through its agents. Furthermore, the
answered over and over again but where no reported decision can be found which gives
the answer." 24 F.R.D. 15.
' The right to counsel in the federal courts is grounded in the sixth amendment:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
assistance of counsel for his defence." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. This provision has
been construed as not being limited to the privilege of being represented by counsel,
but as including the right to have qualified counsel assigned if a defendant, for financial
or other reason, is unable to secure counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
However, the right may be waived by an individual defendant, although the waiver
must be cintelligent and competent." Id. at 465. The United States Code provides:
"In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases
personally or by counsel, as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to
manage and conduct causes therein." 63 Stat. 103 0949). z8 U.S.C. § 1654 (1958).
See generally, on the right to counsel in federal courts, BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN AMERICAN COURTS chs. 3 & 5 (x955); FELLMAN, THE DEPENDANT'S RIGHTS ch. 7
(1958).
The state courts present a somewhat different situation since the right to counsel
under the sixth amendment is not necessarily rendered binding on the states by the
fourteenth amendment. A majority of the Supreme Court continues to follow Betts v.
Brady, 36 U.S. 455 (1942), and uphold an unqualified right to counsel in state courts
only in capital prosecutions and in those non-capital prosecutions where there are particular circumstances indicating injustice or unfairness as a result of a defendant's
inability to obtain counsel. See, for example, Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633 (1959)
and cases cited therein. Even in those cases where a defendant has the right to have
counsel appointed in state courts, however, the right may be waived, although the
Supreme Court may question the validity of the waiver. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S.
155 (1957). For a general treatment of the right to counsel in state courts, see BEANEY,
op. cit. supra note 6, chs. 3 & 45 FELLMAN, The Federal Right to Counsel in State
Courts, 31 NEm. L. REv. 15 (i95).
"Heiskell v. Mozie, 82 F.zd 861 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (dictum)5 MacNeil v. Hearst
Corp., 16o F. Supp. 157 (D.C. Del. 1958) Brandstein v. White Lamps, Inc., 20 F.
Supp. 369 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) Paradise v. Nowlin, 195 P.zd 867 (Cal. App. 1948);
Bennie v. Triangle Ranch Co., 73 Colo. 586, 216 Pac. 718 (19z3); Nispel v. Western
Union R.R., 64 Ill. 311 (1872)5 Kankakee Drainage Dist. v. Commissioners, 29 Ill.
App. 86 (1887)5 Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S.W.2d 977 (1937), New
Jersey Photo Engraving Co. v. Carl Schonert & Sons, Inc., 95 N.J. Eq. 12, 122 At.
307 (1923); Black & White Operating Co. v. Grosbart, 107 N.J.L. 63, 151 Atl. 630
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vast majority of courts have adhered to the rule that the agent through
whom the corporation must appear must be a duly qualified attorney.'
Such a rule, of course, prohibits a corporate officer or employee who is
not an attorney from representing the corporation in litigation. None
of these decisions, however, involved a criminal prosecution.
The traditional rationale for the view that only an attorney may
represent a corporation in court is that a corporation is "an artificial
entity created by law" and as such cannot act as a natural person in
presenting its own case or representing itself in court.' A more meaningful justification is that such a rule prevents "unscrupulous laymen
and disbarred attorneys from maintaining a flourishing practice under
the cloak of being corporate officers." 10 For example, unfortunate defendants might be subject to the severe harassment of groundless,.
malicious suits by a corporate plaintiff whose litigation agents were not
bound by the ethical restraints placed on the legal profession; large
scale "law" practice by corporate agents might, to a degree, render
(1930) ; Aberdeen Bindery, Inc. v. Eastern States Printing & Publishing Co., Inc., 166
Misc. 904, 3 N.Y.S.zd 419 (App. T. 1938); Mortgage Comm'n v. Great Neck Imp.
Co., 16z Misc. 416, z95 N.Y.S. 107 (Sup. Ct. 1937); J. T. Whalen, Inc. v. Pritzert,
167 Misc. 471, 3 N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y. City Ct. 1937)5 Culpeper Nat'l Bank v. Tidewater Imp. Co., ii9 Va. 73, 89 S.E. I18 (1916).
' Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. (9Wheat.) 738, 830 (1824) (dictum)
Mullin-Johnson Co. v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 9 F. Supp. 175 (D.C. Cal. 1934).
See also the cases cited in note 7, supra; 9 FLETrCHER, PRIVATE COu'OaTIONS § 4463
(perm. ed. 1931) Supp. 1959. Contra, A. Victor & Co. v. Sleininger, 255 App. Div.
673, 9 N.Y.S.zd 323 (1939) i Sellent-Repent Corp. v. Queens Borough Gas & Elec.
Co., s6o Misc. 920, 29o N.Y.S. 887 (Sup. Ct. 1936) 3 Milmoe v. Meyer, 15 N.Y.S.zd
899 (Madison County Ct. 1939); ioth St. & Sth Inc. v. Naughton, 163 Misc. 437,
296 N.Y.S. 95z (N.Y.City Ct. 1937).
"Paradise v. Nowlin, 195 P.ad 867 (Cal. App. 1948) and cases cited therein.
Expanding this rationale, one commentator has suggested that, because a natural person
who does not choose to represent himself cannot be represented by other than a licensed
attorney, a corporation, that acts only through agents, should not be given a more,
favored position. 7 BROOKLYN L. REv. 371, 375 (1938)- It seems questionable, however, whether reliance on the archaic notion of corporate disability is any aid to legitimate analysis.
See, e.g., Mortgage Comm'n. v. Great
10 87 U. PA. L. REv. ioo6, 1007 (1939).
Neck Imp. Co., I6z Misc. 416, 295 N.Y.S. 107 (Sup. Ct. 1937). This objection has been
termed "more theoretical than substantial." A. Victor & Co. v. Sleininger, 2SS App.
Div. 673, 676, 9 N.Y.S.2d 323, 326 (1939).
There is also the contention that, even aside from actual litigation, the corporation has already been allowed to take away too much of the lawyer's business. As
early as 1913 one distressed attorney was concerned that, "The lawyer, as such, is being
devoured by his own Frankeinstein." Bristol, Passing of the Legal Profession, 22 YALL
L.J. 590, 613 (1913).
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meaningless the requirement of legal training before admission to
practice before the bar.
Yet, it is questionable whether there is any real justification for a
rule that prohibits a corporation from performing for itself the legal
services that an individual is allowed to perform on his own behalf.
It has been quite properly suggested that the rule is particularly harsh
in its application to financially weak corporations that might forego
action on a meritorious small claim rather than pay the consequent
attorney's fees. 1 Even a corporation with a large claim, that it believed
to be legitimate, might find itself denied its day in court because it could
find no lawyer who would take the case.' 2 One commentator has
observed that the courts have "inherent power to regulate the practice
of law"' and that any real evil that might emerge as a result of litigation in the hands of agents who were not subject to the ethical standards
of members of the bar could be controlled by the expedient of contempt
proceedings.
The question of restricting the conducting of corporate litigation to
members of the legal profession is best put in perspective when it is
regarded as a "problem of using the processes of the law to define and
protect a monopoly."' 4 A monopoly must, in the final analysis, be
beneficial to society in order to justify its continuing existence. Mr.
Justice Cardozo observed that "The tendency of a principle to expand
itself to the limit of its logic may be counteracted by the tendency to
confine itself within the limits of its history.", A beneficial application
of this thesis is demonstrated by the situation presented by the instant
case. It is submitted that the court followed blindly what it considered
to be precedent and that in so doing it failed to reckon with policy
factors that call for a different result.
In determining that the defendant corporation could appear only by
an attorney in this criminal proceeding, the court was following the
precedent of civil actions. The danger of ill-conceived, unscrupulous,
harassing suits, which, to a degree, socially justifies sustaining the
monopoly of the legal profession in corporate civil litigation, is not
present where the corporation is defending a criminal prosecution.
"1 A. Victor & Co.

v. Sleininger, supra note ,o, at 326; 8 BROOKLYN L. REV. 351,

353 2(193)

" A. Victor & Co. v. Sleininger, supra note xo.

2

87 U. PA. L. REV. ioo6, 1007.

"Llewellyn,

The Bar's Troubles, and Poultices---and Cures?, 5 LAW &

PROB. 1o4 (-938).
5 CARDoZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (Igz).

CONTEMP.
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Moreover, there is not the opportunity that there is in civil actions
for an extensive practice of law by legally untrained corporate officials.'"
The interests of society are properly served as long as the corporate
defendant is present in criminal proceedings to present its defenses. It
is hard, unjustified law that, for example, forces a corporation to the
expense of engaging an attorney even if it wishes only to plead guilty
to a criminal charge. No good reason appears for not allowing an
officer of a corporation to appear and defend on the corporation's behalf.
The officer, as an individual, could be made to appear, assuring the
"presence" of the corporate defendant, and there is an identity of interest
in the corporation, as such, and its officers that should insure the presentation of an adequate defense. This identity of interest differentiates
the case of the corporate defendant from that of the individual defendant, who, under settled law, must be represented by a qualified
attorney, if he does not wish to act as his own counsel.
In its practical application, this solution should not materially alter
the present function of the legal profession in defending corporations
in criminal proceedings. The employment of an attorney would be on
the same basis as it is for an individual defendant. If the officer representing the corporation should feel the need of legal assistance in providing an adequate defense to the charge, the corporation would be at
liberty to employ attorneys. Moreover, should the corporation be unable to employ counsel, a court would be free to handle an appointment
as it would in the case of an individual defendant.
Appointment of counsel to represent a criminal defendant was never
conceived of as a means of placing the defendant before the court; it
should not now be so construed. If the corporation does not wish to
employ counsel, it should not be forced to do so absent some compelling
social justification. Unquestionably, the court in the instant decision
was correct in assuming that it must have power to bring the defendants
before it
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unfortunately, it was incorrect in its choice of methods to

accomplish that end. The court, therefore, has allowed its logic to carry
it to an undesirable result.
"eThere is, of course, the possibility that a corporation might attempt to make a
disbarred but able shyster a temporary corporate officer. It would seem, however, that
a court should have adequate control over such a practice through contempt proceedings.
" Since the defendant corporation was a bankrupt, it is possible that the court in
the instant case might have obtained the "presence" of the corporation through the
trustee in bankruptcy, although the problem of the trustee's defending a criminal prosecution against the bankrupt does not appear to have arisen previously. I COLLIER,
BANKRUPTCY § 11.09 (i 4 th ed. 1956).

